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Auditing Predictive Policing
Jeremiah Scanlan*

There is a young man lying on the floor, killed by two rounds fired into his back. A
police officer is questioning the witness and gathering what information he can from her shaky
recollections: approximate height, weight, and facial features. He takes note of the
neighborhood’s placement in between battling gangs. At the police station, he collects more
information recorded by camera footage, gunshot detection systems, and other electronic sources
to better understand the context of the crime. Until now, this is how we would expect a twentyfirst century investigation to proceed.
However, times have changed, and these data points are not analyzed by the officer
alone. Now this information is plugged into a complex algorithm. The algorithm sifts through the
information and compares it with thousands of data points gathered over decades of traditional
police work as well as data from social media. The algorithm then puts out a prediction: these are
your most likely culprits. The prediction list rides with the officer on his patrols. The next time
he sees someone from this list, he will take special care to watch the suspect’s actions. The
officer might even preemptively visit a name from the list in the suspect’s home, bringing a
warning of the consequences of breaking the law.
This technology is not from a science fiction movie like Steven Spielberg’s Minority
Report. These technologies have already been employed in cities such as Los Angeles, Chicago,
and Kansas City, Mo.1 “Predictive policing” algorithms are the tool of the future for police
departments and more police departments are using them every year.2 Meanwhile, the race to
examine the legal implications is playing catch up.
One implication stands out: the possibility of bias working its way into a predictive
policing algorithm’s decision-making process. In 2016, a coalition of organizations headed by
the ACLU expressed concerns about the possibility of racial bias and lack of transparency
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around the programs.3 However, the possibility of bias has largely passed unnoticed by the
public and policymakers.4
Some alert experts have offered solutions to police predictive policing,5 but the ideas
have largely been vague. If predictive policing is to be held accountable, there must be a model
of legal mechanisms to allow for transparency and accountability. This article proposes that
legislatures should design statutes that require frequent external audits of predictive policing
software as used by police departments.
In Part I, I will give a brief history and an explanation of predictive policing. Part II will
examine the potential for bias even when data or algorithmic decision-making is not coded to be
explicitly biased. In Part III, I will explain how audits are a practical solution to problems of
transparency and accountability, as well as how these audits should be designed. Simply auditing
the algorithm is not enough to inform the public, which is why Part IV will explain the need for
publicly released audit reports and the information that should be included in them.
I. What is Predictive Policing?
Prediction has always been a part of the effort to prevent crime. In a typical criminal
investigation, the police try to understand their targets better by putting together the facts and
studying them for patterns. Predictive policing has the same goal, but with modern tools such as
specialized statistical techniques, big data, and the computational power beyond that of a normal
human being. As Andrew Ferguson puts it, this is “…more a shift in tools than strategy.”6
The first efforts to use statistics to study crime can be traced back to the 1920s, when
statistical methods were tested to predict how likely a given individual was to relapse into crime.
Now, over half of US states use some form of statistical method to predict parole recidivism.7
New statistical techniques were then developed to work with geographic data. Police
departments hired analysts to look at the data and identify crime “hot spots,” which allowed
departments to focus their resources more efficiently.8 In the early 2000’s, Chief William Bratton
in Los Angeles worked with a research team at the University of California, Los Angeles to
create a software program based on these techniques. This software eventually became PredPol,
a leading prediction software package.9
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Today, rather than just plotting out hot spots, many software packages focus on
predicting individual offenders and victims.10 Police departments across the country are now
adopting these prediction programs or developing their own.11
Naturally, the first question to ask is whether predictive policing is effective.
Unfortunately, there is still no clear answer. Police departments such as the Chicago Police
Department tout lower crime rates, claiming that the reduction is a direct result of predictive
policing.12 However, the few independent academic studies on predictive policing have shown
mixed results, and have not established that it has significant effect on reducing crime.13 The
software companies themselves have paired up with academics to perform studies that have
shown that predictive policing has reduces crime, but this also raises conflict of interest issues in
play that cast a shadow on the credibility of the results.14
Companies and departments have been reluctant to share any details of the algorithmic
process to keep secrets away from competitors or anyone that would attempt to “game” the
system.15 Nonetheless, these concerns have not stopped companies from marketing predictive
policing as a panacea for crime, nor stopped departments from enthusiastically adopting it
because that might be true.16
Another concern is that predictive policing could exacerbate problems of bias among the
police. Skeptical activist groups such as the ACLU have issued statements of concern that
10
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predictive policing could be unfairly biased against minorities groups.17 One non-peer-reviewed
study by ProPublica found evidence of racial bias in related parole recidivism algorithms in
Florida, but this is so far the only study on the subject.18 Newspaper reporters have also begun to
mention the possibility of bias when reporting on predictive policing.19
The legal literature on predictive policing is growing, but still sparse. Some authors have
offered solutions to problems of bias and accountability, but these solutions have often been
general suggestions rather than concrete specifics.20 The lack of legal literature is mirrored by a
lack of attention by reporters and the general public.
Some researchers have written about the possibility of algorithmic bias outside of
predictive policing, for instance in credit scoring or hiring algorithms.21 Scholars and experts
continue to debate the best methods to discover and counteract algorithmic bias. Yet because
algorithms are so complex and the field is relatively new, there is still no consensus on what the
best methods are. However, many experts agree that something must be done to prevent bias.
Predictive policing is not just the future, it is the present; the hypothetical proposed in the
introduction could happen today in Chicago, or tomorrow in the next city to buy predictive
policing software. As the technology continues to advance, algorithms assist more in the
decision-making process, and will perhaps make decisions on their own. These decisions may
disproportionately affect communities and individuals based on skin color, gender, age, or other
characteristics, even when that is not the algorithm’s designed intent.
Predictive policing is here, but its effects have not been adequately measured and
problems of transparency and accountability have not been addressed. This is the heart of the
problem that this article seeks to address and the hole it seeks to fill. The effects of predictive
policing cannot be measured adequately if companies and police departments make it difficult
for future experts to review what predictive policing algorithms do. Thus, this article proposes
regular audits of predictive policing algorithms in order to catch and prevent bias.
II. The Potential of Predictive Policing Bias
The potential for bias is not unique to predictive policing. Activists, technology experts,
and policy makers have discussed the possibility of bias in algorithms, big data, and machine
learning broadly, as well as specific applications in areas such as credit score reporting and
employment. To understand how algorithms may be biased, we first need to understand
something of how they are created.
Computer programmers create a series of decisions that an algorithm uses to come to a
certain conclusion. If the programmer is designing an algorithm that will decide whether to sell
17
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lemonade on a certain day, the decisions might look something like: If it’s sunny outside, then
sell, if it’s rainy outside, then don’t, and if it’s cloudy outside, look at the temperature. The
algorithm’s conclusion is a sum of the decisions that the programmer makes; after all, she is the
one who knows that when it’s sunny outside it will be better for business. This is perhaps the
simplest way of approaching an algorithm. Thus, the first place to worry about bias entering the
system is at the very beginning, with the programmer herself.
However, it isn’t likely that the programmer will write bias into the code. Although it
would be convenient to find the line of code that says, “if suspect is black, then arrest,” this is an
obvious issue that companies and police departments would want to prevent. In fact,
programmers may not even include race in the code. For example, leading predictive policing
company PredPol claims that it only inputs three variables into its algorithm: type of crime,
crime location, and time of the crime.22
Yet the fact that a company does not code bias into an algorithm or include racial factors
does not mean that the algorithm is free of bias. It is possible for an algorithm to use factors that
instead act as proxies for bias.23 For example, poor socioeconomic conditions in many
neighborhoods are correlated with race.24 In the context of criminal data, race could also be
correlated with gang membership and community affiliations. Thus, an algorithm may take racial
factors into account even when the programmers did not originally intend it.
The problem of discovering bias is further compounded by the fact that not even the
programmers themselves are entirely positive of what is going on under the hood of their
algorithms, especially when they incorporate machine learning. Machine learning techniques
create algorithms that are difficult to understand.25 For example, a predictive policing algorithm
that uses machine learning may not be trained to “solve” the problem of “When will crime
happen?” Instead, the machine learning algorithm might be presented with a series of
hypothetical scenarios – say time of day, season, and nearby landmarks. It would also be given
the thousands and thousands of data points past and present about various factors – the variables
already mentioned, perhaps past crimes, and others. Then the algorithm connects these data
points, at first almost at random, trying to predict whether a crime will occur in the hypothetical
scenario. If the algorithm does not predict the outcome correctly it goes back to the drawing
board and starts making those connections again. If it predicts the outcome more precisely, the
connections that helped it make that decision are incorporated into the code while the rest of the
algorithm goes back to the drawing board again.
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This process is repeated thousands upon thousands of times until the machine learning
algorithm begins to successfully predict what happened in these hypothetical scenarios. This is
somewhat akin to the idea of “brute force” discovering a pin number or password. If “1111”
doesn’t work, then maybe “1112” will, and if that does not work then it’s time to try “1113,” and
so on. Computers can process these calculations much faster than a human brain, using datasets
that contain millions of data points. However, the result is that the original programmers – and
even the algorithms themselves – aren't necessarily aware of why the algorithm decides what it
does, only that it does. These “black box” algorithmic systems are difficult to completely
unravel.26
This is where the potential for algorithmic bias is the most dangerous, in large part
because it is difficult for even technical experts to understand what is happening. The algorithm
comes to its conclusions mostly through processing the data. This means that if the data is biased
the decisions the algorithm comes to will be biased, without anyone being the wiser. As one
researcher put it, “bias in, bias out.”27
Predictive policing algorithms also have a greater potential to be biased than other
machine learning algorithms for a variety of reasons. First, criminal justice data is often
incomplete. Police department records may not be extensive, especially in smaller cities, which
may not have the resources to collect and store robust data.28 Even in big cities, historical data
may not extend very far, and much of the data will have been collected in recent years.29 As a
report commissioned by the White House put it, “criminal justice data is notoriously poor.”30
Because these algorithms often require massive datasets, using incomplete data and small sample
sizes will certainly leave holes in the final analysis.
Additionally, criminal justice data often reflects an implicit bias. The fact that police
interact with and even arrest racial minorities more often than members of other groups means
that these actions will be recorded as data. Similarly, if police focus their resources on patrolling
high-crime areas, those areas will show up in the dataset more often and in more detail. There is
the possibility that this creates a feedback loop where the police patrol the same areas, because
more crime happens there, which leads to more data being collected, which leads to more police
being sent to the same area.31
These problems are aggravated because of the credibility lent to the idea of “data.”
Companies and police departments are all too willing to accept the data and the conclusions
26
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reached by the algorithm as “the truth” because data is so often thought of as objective truth.32
The officer on duty may not hesitate to question how the data was gathered or why the algorithm
is programmed to suggest to suspect person x, and rightfully so, as that isn’t necessarily her job.
More poor data is fed into the system, leading to a reinforcement of biased decision making, yet
these interactions are recorded as facts rather than the decisions of implicit or explicit police bias.
Policy makers have become aware of these problems and in many states have enacted
laws requiring audits of police department data. However, these laws are weak in practice and
have largely been ignored by police departments.33 Additionally, these laws were not designed
with predictive policing or big data machine learning algorithms in mind.
In summary, the potential for bias in predictive policing systems comes not only from
how the code is written but from the data that is fed into it. Poor data, or even good data poorly
chosen, can lead algorithms to learn bias even though this is not what the algorithms’ creators
intended. I propose audits of the algorithms that police departments use as a check against these
potential biases.
III. Predictive Policing Audits
Predictive policing has been adopted without much resistance or a careful examination of
the potential consequences. Companies and police departments have held onto their secrets while
activists have failed to get the attention of lawmakers.34 A more transparent process would
increase trust in predictive policing methods and enable concerned citizens and policymakers to
examine its effects. I propose that Congress and state legislatures should pass legislation that
require external audits of the predictive policing algorithms that police departments use. These
audits would examine algorithms for disparate impact by using the most up-to-date tools
developed by big data and machine learning experts.
A. Audits Provide Transparency and Accountability
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Transparency and accountability are essential checks against institutions such as the
police. In this context, transparency means sharing information on government processes as
broadly as possible without compromising citizens’ safety or peaceful private interests. Regular
audits by technical experts will provide the transparency and accountability that currently does
not exist for predictive policing.
i. Transparency and Accountability are Essential for Democracy and the Police
Democratic societies need transparent institutions to flourish. Healthy democracy needs
an active and engaged citizenry that understands the issues that it faces, which enables citizens to
make informed decisions about governance.35 This is particularly vital to preserve the rights of
minorities and marginalized groups that may not wield as much political influence. Transparency
provides essential knowledge of government actions so that the citizenry can make these
evaluations. Without the knowledge provided by transparency, citizens will not be able to have a
say because they will not even know what questions to ask about how the government behaves.
Certainly, the ideal of a fully engaged citizenry is not realized in real life, but there are still
thinkers, activists, and policymakers who are engaged. Transparency can, at the very least,
provide these key groups with the information they need to find and debate appropriate solutions.
Transparency and accountability also increase trust in institutions. It is no secret that
public trust in the police has become a hot topic in recent years.36 When the public and the police
do not trust each other, relations and cooperation break down. The public becomes more fearful,
which makes it harder for the police to do their jobs.
Secretive predictive policing methods will not improve this relationship. Transparency
would improve public trust in predictive policing, which would then improve the public’s
relationship with the police. If the public and police have a mutual understanding and respect,
they will be able to cooperate to solve the problems that face communities.
ii. Audits Provide Transparency and Accountability by Allowing Experts to Examine the
Algorithms
Transparency and accountability are particularly important for topics which are as
obscure and technical as predictive policing algorithms can be. The effects and potential biases
of predictive algorithms are likely to be understood fully by only a small number of experts in
the field. If transparency does not exist for these algorithms, there is little chance that anyone
will have the information needed to decide whether they are harmful or how they should be used
and regulated. In fact, as noted above, many people still aren’t even aware that predictive
policing techniques exist.
If enough transparency for algorithms exists, experts who are interested in finding
solutions to the problem it will be able to do so. Many experts are already very concerned about
the potential problems predictive algorithms could pose.37 However, at this point many of their
35
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opinions are still limited to conjecture and generalization because of a lack of transparency. Once
experts can analyze the algorithms, they will then be able to educate the public and inform a
broader debate. Predictive policing may be a benefit to society, or it may be harmful, but there is
not enough information yet to have much of a debate at all.
Requiring regular audits of predictive policing algorithms used by police departments
would go a long way towards establishing this sorely needed transparency. Audits could not only
catch bias red-handed but motivate a measure of preventative caution.
The most obvious benefit of an audit would be to catch algorithmic bias in the act. Again,
these biases may creep in completely unexpected, even out of data that would, on its face, seem
to be completely unbiased. The audit would act as a kind of peer review, checking for problems
that not even companies and departments had thought of.
Another, perhaps more important effect of auditing would be to motivate companies and
police departments to be on their toes and actively search for these biases. If a police department
knows that it will be audited, it will most likely want to perform well on that audit. This provides
an incentive to be on the lookout for problems in the algorithm. This can lead to more
fundamental changes than if an audit simply finds the algorithm to be biased because companies
and police departments would be motivated to look at practices that have so far escaped scrutiny.
For example, police departments would need to examine their practices from beginning to end,
from the data collection process to the implementation by officers on the job. In doing so,
departments and companies may find solutions that would not be prescribed by the audit. The
threat of audits would therefore have the possibility of preventing bias by motivating predictive
policing users to examine the problem and find solutions. As the old adage goes, “An ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure.”
Requiring frequent audits is also important because algorithms are in a state of constant
change. New data is added into the system every day and analyzed for patterns.38 It is possible
that an algorithm that does not exhibit bias today may, with addition of new datasets and
information, exhibit bias in six months. Legislatures should consult with experts to establish
audit requirements at intervals that are frequent enough to adapt to new problems but not so
frequent that they strain department resources. A small police department in a rural town that
uses location-based predictive policing in a limited context will not experience the same amount
of flux and change in its algorithm as a police department in a metropolitan area that is flooded
with new data daily. In this example, it may be more appropriate for the small police department
to be required to contract an audit only once every two years, while the department in the big city
should be audited every six months.
Of course, these fields are still developing, and an audit may not even find that there is a
clear answer to whether a predictive policing algorithm is biased. This is not a problem because
the goals of the audits—transparency, accountability, and catching offenders—are only one part
of the larger objective to prevent bias. Additionally, part of the broader goal is to facilitate
discussion, and that discussion will best be fueled with better information. The audit process will
necessarily require more dialogue between departments, companies, auditors, those they report
to, and the general public. Once auditors can reveal just how predictive policing is implemented,

38

Rob Kitchin, Thinking critically about and researching algorithms, 20 INFO. COMM. AND
SOC’Y 14, 18 (2017) (“[algorithms] are ontogenetic in nature (always in a state of becoming),
teased into being: edited, revised, deleted and restarted…”).

these communities can discuss its positive and negative impacts and how best to create rules for
its usage.
iii. Objections to Audits
Transparency skeptics may point out that establishing an auditing system for predictive
policing in the name of transparency may set a precedent that would reach far beyond law
enforcement. This precedent may spur legislation that seeks to examine the inner workings of all
sorts of algorithms, not just for bias but for any number of reasons. Companies such as Google
and Facebook are understandably protective of the closely-kept secrets of the algorithms that
have made them very wealthy. Trade secrets will be addressed more fully later in the article, but
it is important to address the argument that this precedent could eventually lead to a sort of
algorithmic witch hunt.
In response, it is important to ask whether this would be a bad thing. Algorithms govern
more and more of our daily lives, from giving us suggestions on where to eat, to determining
who might employ us.39 The extent to which we interact with algorithms will only increase from
this point forward. We may be long overdue for a systematic process to ensure the quality of
these algorithms and examine their impact.
More importantly, the recommendation of this article is specific to law enforcement due
to the important social, government, and constitutional issues involved. The police have become
the focal point of much criticism lately for a variety of reasons, but a common theme among
them is the desire to prevent the abuse of power by government offices that we have entrusted
with our own protection. The possibility for predictive policing algorithms to cause harm is
proportional to the great responsibilities and powers that the citizens and governments have
given to the police.
The flip side of these responsibilities is that the police are, at least in theory, ultimately
answerable to the public through local government participation. These methods of addressing
the problem are fundamentally a public governmental process. Thus, audits are a public
governmental solution. Likewise, transparency is a necessity for good governance and for
democracy.40 The methods for addressing the problems presented by Google’s algorithms would
be different and would not be rooted in this process, so the precedent set in this case would not
immediately extend to private companies. Auditing predictive policing algorithms is a solution
for the problem of predictive policing, which is why I only recommend audits for police
departments. This article does not necessarily recommend audits in other areas.
Skeptics might also object to the costs that audits would impose on police departments,
which would also be costs for taxpayers. Managing audits could also put extra strain on the
federal government or state governments that oversee some of the process.
The benefits already listed far outweigh the potential costs of creating or reinforcing
discriminatory practices among the police. Additionally, audits and the frequency of audits
would necessarily be tailored to the circumstances of the department. Small departments with
fewer resources to spend on an audit will also be spending fewer resources on these kinds of
programs and data collection in the first place, so the expense of the audit would be proportional
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to the expense of the programs. Bigger departments with more data and more expensive
techniques will likewise be expected to require more expensive, more frequent audits.
It is worth questioning whether audits are the best of any available method for
transparency and accountability. First, it is unreasonable to expect companies or police
departments to release the code for public review. Not only would companies lose trade secrets
they have worked hard to develop, but the public in general would most likely not understand the
code. Auditing provides a middle ground for experts to analyze the data then release a report to
the public while protecting information that should not be released.
Second, although governments could require companies to design algorithms with checks
against bias, we should hesitate to give governmental bodies such a mandate. No matter how
well-intentioned policy makers might be, such technical solutions are best left to experts who are
reviewing the technology first-hand. It is important to give companies and departments the
flexibility to find appropriate solutions to these problems. Although I am comfortable with the
possibility of government stepping in to audit more algorithms, I am not comfortable with
precedent that would allow government to change algorithms at a whim and dictate more broadly
what they should or should not do.
Finally, although there may be problems with predictive policing algorithms, there is no
reason to simply ban their use. Predictive policing has the potential to have a positive impact in
enhancing law enforcement performance and efficiency and may even be used to correct bias
among officers.41
Before we can see the benefits of predictive policing, it needs to be transparent and
accountable. If experts can assess algorithms through audits, the public can be more reasonably
assured that they are not biased.
B. The Auditing Process
This article does not attempt to outline every facet of the auditing process. That will best
be left to technical professionals and legislatures to decide. However, there are some key points
specific to predictive policing algorithms that the auditing process should include. The audit
should test algorithms as used by police departments for disparate impact against a variety of
different groups.
i. External Audits Examine Algorithms Used by Police Departments
Police department audits, such as financial or performance audits, are usually handled by
audit offices within the departments themselves. Depending on the topics being audited, audits
may be handled by other agencies with the proper oversight, such as a city government, a state
attorney general, or even the Department of Justice.42 These audits are not always published or
made accessible to the public. This article encourages external audits rather than internal audits
to achieve the goal of transparency.
If an audit is performed internally by a police department, it is reasonable to expect some
public skepticism about its validity. Indeed, police departments have been known to misrepresent
41
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statistics to dishonestly diminish negative practices or enhance positive outcomes.43 Of course,
this problem is not unique to police departments; some suspicion would certainly be reasonable
towards any internal audit. I also do not mean to ignore the efforts of internal department
auditing offices established in good faith and operating exactly as expected. Nevertheless, this
does not change the fact that audit reports published by an internal office, no matter how well
done or honest, may fall under suspicion.
External audits appear to provide a more reliable, objective alternative. Audits have been
performed at times by local and state governments. Some cities have created an Office of the
Independent Police Auditor charged with the specific task of overseeing the city’s police
department.44 These auditors appear to be more credible because they do not answer to the
departments themselves. Audits could also be performed by external firms and contractors. At
least one enterprising young company already offers to audit algorithms for potential
discrimination, and its certification is seen as something akin to an “organically grown” sticker
for algorithms, showing that the algorithm is free from unrecognized biases or other harmful
effects.45
ii. The Audit Analyzes Protected Groups
The main purpose of the audit is to analyze predictive policing algorithms for bias against
protected groups as defined by federal law. The ultimate consequences of an audit would be to
give the Department of Justice the necessary facts to bring a pattern and practice lawsuit against
the department or company. A sample of protected groups that may be discriminated against
include those that have been set out in federal law: race, religion, sex, national origin,46 age,47 or
disability.48 Other groups not specifically covered in federal law would LGBTQ groups.
The audit would focus on discrimination against these groups because there are usually
legal mechanisms that can protect them. However, this does not mean that legislatures should
prohibit auditors from examining additional groups of concern. An audit that seeks to discover
potential racial biases is likely to uncover other problems in the process – for example, patrols
that are assigned more heavily than necessary towards poorer parts of cities, which may also
correlate with race. Auditors should have the freedom to examine other problems and possible
solutions.
iii. The Standard of Disparate Impact
Determining whether there is bias against these groups is a difficult question to answer.
The federal law mentioned above typically defines discrimination using the standard of
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“disparate impact.” Disparate impact was first established in the context of employment in the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,49 and its use has been upheld by the Supreme Court in other contexts,
such as housing.50 An action that causes disparate impact leads to unequal, harmful treatment of
members of a protected group. This impact does not have to be crafted intentionally.51 Audits
should use the standard of disparate impact to evaluate whether an algorithm is biased.
The process of assessing disparate impact of algorithms has been described as: “[One,]
Statistical evidence demonstrating a disproportionate adverse impact caused by a policy or
procedure; [Two], Assessing whether the policy or procedure serves a valid purpose and the
extent thereof; and [Three,] Assessing whether there are alternative policies or procedures that
would achieve the legitimate objective with less of a disparate impact.”52 Following this process
would help satisfy statutory and judicial definitions of disparate impact.
The applications to a predictive policing audit follow naturally. First, the audit would
have to show that the algorithm causes statistically observable biases of police conduct against a
given group. For example, the algorithm might suggest that a city’s Latino sector should be
patrolled in a statistically disproportionate manner. This could cause harm by increasing the
number of arrests among this population in a similarly statistically disproportionate manner.
Second, the audit would examine whether the algorithm is accomplishing what it needs
to. Is it predicting crime accurately? Are the streets safer? In the hypothetical case above, the
algorithm may be hurting more than it is helping.
Finally, the audit would examine whether there are better alternatives to predictive
policing. The department could return to using more traditional methods. Or, the audit could
suggest that the department improve its data collection methods, change how the officers use the
algorithms, or even suggest how to tweak the code itself to correct biased predictions.
The audit’s purpose would not be to punish police departments or demand binding
changes. The goal is transparency, and auditors would not be given powers beyond that of
making recommendations, functioning more as a peer review of the technology. This is part of
the reason why auditors should be given the authority to examine a wide range of topics and
potential biases.
Of course, proper government officials can take action when necessary. For example, if
an audit that reveals that an algorithm exhibits clear disparate impact and this has led to a
negative impact on a city’s protected groups, it could be appropriate for the Department of
Justice to bring a pattern or practice lawsuit against the police department.53
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iv. Auditing Tools and Methods
The audit will need to test for statistical evidence of disparate impact by using a wide
variety of techniques and procedures developed by the technological community. Predictive
policing algorithms, like other algorithms, come in many different flavors. Even when
considering a single type of algorithm, there is no consensus, despite plenty of debate, on the
best method to test it for bias. Thus, the auditors should be prepared to use several different
methods before being satisfied that they have examined the algorithm thoroughly.
The first step, naturally, is to look at the code of the algorithm. This may give auditors a
glimpse of the full picture, but it is very different from running the algorithm. Especially with
machine learning, an algorithm needs to be fed data before auditors can understand how it
works.54
This is why auditors should also use “black-box” styles of testing. Black-box methods
observe both the inputs and outputs to an algorithm. By tweaking the different inputs and
observing how the algorithm processes them, auditors can learn a lot about how the code
works.55 Other related techniques include running dummy data through the algorithm, using
“scraping” and “sock-puppet” algorithms, running experiments with the algorithm using real
world users (“crowdsourcing” audits), and others.56
This list is meant to establish a minimum standard for the breadth of tests that should be
required to satisfy auditors and, consequently, the public. It is not an exhaustive list. Each
method has its own strengths and drawbacks. Experts are aware of these differences and
vigorously discuss them. They will continue to develop best practices, and I certainly hope that
the discussion will continue.
Additionally, audits should look at the entire process from beginning to end. Because the
inner workings of algorithms are often inscrutable, it is important to examine how an algorithm
is used within its full context. It might not even be appropriate in many cases for the audit to
make recommendations on changes to the code itself, but on the processes leading up to and
occurring after the algorithm’s decision.
In particular, the audits should take special care to examine the data and the data
collection process because this is a possible cause of bias. Additionally, it would certainly be
appropriate to revive current and past legislation on database audits that have fallen into
disrepair.57 This would provide a valuable complement to audits of predictive policing.
Predictive policing algorithms should also be required to keep an audit log, a
timestamped record of actions taken by the algorithm. This audit log could be required as part of
legislation on obligatory audits or in another piece of legislation. Audit logs are already required
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in other technology sectors and would be invaluable to auditors who are attempting to verify an
algorithm’s processes.58
Auditing with a variety of different methods can catch disparate impact in predictive
policing algorithms and inspire change. However, change may not come if only the police and
the auditors see the results. Thus, legislatures should mandate a final step in the auditing process:
an audit report.
IV. Audit Reports
The audit report is an essential part of the auditing process. None of the benefits of
transparency will be available if the public does not have access to the audit’s findings. Police
departments will naturally be worried about revealing sensitive information to the public that
could be used to compromise law enforcement purposes, and companies will not want to reveal
trade secrets. These are valid concerns. This article does not suggest that everything that an audit
discovers should be available to the public. However, audit reports should not be kept secret;
every audit report should be released to the public. The question is then: What should be
included in the audit report?
Thankfully, there is precedent in this area that can guide legislatures to find a reasonable
compromise between transparency and the interests of police departments and software
companies. I suggest that the basic inputs and outputs of an algorithm should be made available
in all public audit reports, as well as details on how the algorithms are implemented in daily
procedure and assessments on the algorithms’ potential bias. These suggestions are based
primarily on provisions provided by the Freedom of Information Act.
A. The Freedom of Information Act: Basics
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),59 created in 1967, is designed to “[keep]
citizens in the know about their government” by making federal agency records public.60 It has
been amended several times and subjected to various executive orders, both to provide more
transparency and to create more exemptions for agencies wishing to keep their records out of the
public eye.61 Nonetheless, it has remained the most important legislation of its type in the United
States and provides a certain standard for transparency that we can apply to these audit reports.
FOIA is a federal law, but most state freedom of information laws are patterned after it.62
In this section we will focus on the federal FOIA because there is not enough space to explain all
the intricacies of the various state laws. The discussion here can be taken as a broad template that
can be applied to more individual circumstances. It is worth noting that at least one lawsuit in
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New York successfully secured the release of predictive policing documents under New York’s
freedom of information law.63
B. What the Report Includes
FOIA allows the public to request documents from government agencies. This original
mandate is broad and sweeping; under it, citizens are entitled to request whatever document they
desire. However, the statute also includes nine exemptions that limit this mandate. Exemption 7
exempts the records of law enforcement agencies from being requested under certain
circumstances.64
I will now discuss the bare minimum that a publicly-released audit report should include,
using these exemptions as a guide. I will also discuss other statutes when relevant. However, it is
valuable to remember that these are exceptions to the rule, rather than the rule itself, which
requires broadly that agencies give up their records.
i. Data and Inputs
As has been discussed extensively above, the data that enters the algorithm is the first
point of potential bias.65 Thus, any public discussion of possible bias and possible remedies to
bias in predictive policing models needs to begin at an understanding of what data police
departments are recording and feeding into the model. Knowledge of this data could also foster a
discussion that continues beyond the realm of predictive policing, as communities attempt to
examine root causes of the kinds of behavior that departments are ultimately attempting to
correct through law enforcement. However, this is also the part of the report that will likely need
to be the least specific and the most heavily redacted so that police departments can continue to
fight crime effectively.
First, personal information cannot be released to the public. This is covered in exemption
7(c) of FOIA,66 as well as the Privacy Act of 1974,67 which prohibits federal agencies from
releasing any personal information. In the context of predictive policing data, this would include
names, addresses, phone numbers, and any other personal information. This also applies to
criminal records. However, this does not prevent a report from detailing the types of criminal
records that are used by the algorithm. In that case, personal information would not be revealed.
Second, exemption 7(e) also applies to records that “would disclose techniques and
procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for
law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected
to risk circumvention of the law.”68 The language of the statute and the subsequent interpretation
by courts have been rather broad in deciding what could “reasonably be expected” to
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compromise law enforcement activities,69 including a wide range of activities, both known and
unknown to the public.70
Using this exemption as a guideline, the public audit report should exempt any data that
is gathered using methods that, if they were known, would “risk circumvention of the law.”71
Using examples that have appeared in court rulings, this would mean that a report would not
include data gathered through undercover surveillance techniques or operations. Federal
databases have also been protected by FOIA, and so should not be disclosed in a public report.72
Generally, it could be said that the more sensitive the data, the more likely it is that the
exemption would apply.
It may appear that in the end the report would not disclose much of the data the algorithm
uses, but the truth is that much of this data does not fall under these exemptions. Each predictive
policing algorithm uses different kinds of data, but here are some ideas as to the data that should
be released in the report: socioeconomic factors, “hot spot” locations, including neighborhoods,
weather, type of crime, types of historical criminal records, and time of the crime. These types of
data are not controversial, do not reveal personal information, and in many cases are already
public. Police department objectives will certainly not be compromised if the public knows that
the algorithm considers whether the day of the crime is cloudy or sunny. Of course, the public
might not care either, as weather probably has nothing to do with bias. Nonetheless, the point is
that transparency means that police departments should release as much data to the public as
possible rather than the bare minimum.
Consider how the public could react if it knows that the department feeds into the
algorithm a list of locations in the city that are considered to be high-risk, such as banks, schools,
and restaurants.73 The public could examine whether or not these locations are associated or
correlated with problematic biases – for instance, particular restaurants in a low-income area of
the city. Then the public could demand that police departments ensure that these factors are not
weighted disproportionately. The public could also shine a light on how to solve these issues
through community action. Knowledge of the data that the algorithms use is the first, vital step to
creating transparency and accountability for predictive policing.
ii. Outputs and How Algorithms Are Employed
Transparency begins with data, but it must also include the algorithms’ outputs and
recommendations. Therefore, it is vital for an audit report to release these outputs to the public,
as well as an assessment on their potential problems and details on how the results are used in the
day-to-day of law enforcement. A report that did not include algorithmic outputs would not
allow for transparency because, in the end, these outputs are what police departments act on.
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For location-based predictive policing models, the report should reveal the specific areas
that the algorithm has suggested require special attention. If the public knows what
neighborhoods or city blocks are receiving attention, it will be able to better understand how the
algorithm makes decisions and whether those decisions are biased. For instance, if it is revealed
that an algorithm recommends that most police patrols be allocated to the Latino sectors of a
city, the citizens could then have a discussion as to whether there is any bias involved.
Police departments might worry that revealing this information could endanger officers
working in those areas or “risk circumvention of the law.” However, criminals likely already
know where patrols are allocated, so this information would not likely do them any good and
would not endanger officers any more than they already expect.74
However, the report should not reveal algorithmic outputs that identify individuals. Not
only would this violate individual privacy, it would certainly run a greater risk of endangering
officers and “risk circumvention of the law.” If an individual knows that an algorithm has added
her to a list of potential offenders, and if that individual breaks the law, she will most likely take
extra precautions against law enforcement catching her.
Instead of revealing outputs that identify individuals, the report should use hypothetical
data to illustrate how the algorithm works. Creating such hypotheticals would almost certainly
already be part of the audit process. Take an example where an algorithm attempts to predict
who is more likely to be involved in gang violence. The audit report could include the
algorithm’s analysis of two hypothetical individuals that are identical except for their ethnicity. If
one of the individuals is Hispanic, does the algorithm rate his threat level differently? The public
could then evaluate whether the algorithm’s decision is justified given the data it uses. This
process would preserve privacy while also giving the public an honest look at predictive policing
analyses.
The report must also include details on how the algorithm is used in the day-to-day of law
enforcement. Is it used by command staff to make top-down decisions or is it used by patrol
officers? How often and why do officers act on the algorithm’s suggestions while on patrol?
How are they trained to use the algorithms? This information is the vital link between the theory
of predictive policing and how it impacts the lives of citizens.
iii. The Final Assessment and Recommendations
Reporting on the outputs is closely linked to an assessment of the outputs. The report
must include an assessment of whether and how the predictive policing instrument is biased.
This is the heart of the report, the part that the public is most interested in hearing. Discussions of
data and outputs are important, but the technical layman will be most interested in whether
experts give the program a thumbs up or a thumbs down.
Often, the nature of such complex systems will not be easy to explain or be fully
analyzed. The experts may not come to a solid conclusion of “yes, it is biased” or “no, it is not.”
Thus, the report must be honest and balanced. It must include every pertinent detail and
conclusion possible while still adhering to the guidelines already established. The report need not
limit itself to examining disparate impact; if other issues are discovered, they must be addressed.
The report must also include suggestions for possible solutions or alternatives for any problem
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that the audit uncovers. This assessment would jump-start public discussion and likely prompt
earnest soul-searching for police departments.
The report’s recommendations make up the primary call to action that police departments
should act upon. Recommendations would be tailored to the needs of the department and the
circumstances of its jurisdiction. Recommendations could include methods to clean and update
databases, selections of data that should or should not be used, changes in department policies
that break feedback loops, changes in how officers on patrol use algorithmic predictions,
reallocation of resources away from specific neighborhoods, or others. Although these
recommendations would not be binding, pressure by the public, interest groups, and government
officials would motivate departments to enact them.75 If that fails, the public could demand that
local government oblige departments to change their practices.
Additionally, it is important to emphasize here that the focus is on algorithms as used by
departments and not as created by companies. Audits can certainly find problems and make
recommendations on algorithms straight out of the box. However, the problems really begin
when algorithms are given police department data to chew on. This is why the audit would
primarily give recommendations to police departments. Companies would receive notification of
these recommendations to understand how to make improvements. When it is possible to
distinguish the effects of the police department’s data from the code created by the company,
then the report would make recommendations directly to the company.
iv. Trade Secrets
The companies that have created this predictive policing software may fear that this
report would reveal valuable information about how the algorithm is created that could then be
copied by competitors. However, there is no reason to fear that the report will reveal any such
trade secrets. The report will only reveal algorithmic inputs and outputs. It does not reveal the
inner workings or code of the algorithm. Neither is it practical for any enterprising citizens to
reverse-engineer the algorithm from a knowledge of these statistics, especially considering the
complex nature of many machine learning algorithms already mentioned above.76
C. Report Summary
The report is an essential part of the audit process. Using guidelines such as FOIA, a
report that details algorithmic inputs and outputs as well as an assessment by the auditors follows
legal precedent while allowing the public to know as many of the facts as possible. These facts
will give the public enough knowledge to be able to advocate effectively and demand specific
change, but without compromising police departments’ objectives.
V. Conclusion
Predictive policing may discriminate against protected groups. This bias may be
intentional or unintentional. Because companies and police departments are reluctant to release
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information about how predictive policing works, policymakers and the public do not know
enough to adequately debate its benefits and drawbacks.
Nonetheless, police departments in cities across the nation will continue to implement
predictive policing. This will fundamentally change the way that we are policed, whether we like
it or not. Without transparency and accountability, potential discrimination by predictive policing
algorithms may continue unnoticed and unchanged. We need changes in the present to protect
the cities and neighborhoods of the future.
I propose that legislatures should solve this problem by providing transparency and
accountability through regular audits of predictive policing technology used by police
departments. Audits can discover and then report on discrimination in the algorithmic process.
Regular auditing would also give companies and police departments an incentive to find and
solve these problems, either on their own or using the audit’s suggestions.
The audits would review every step of the predictive policing process using a variety of
statistical techniques. Discrimination would be assessed using a standard of disparate impact. An
audit report would then be released to the public, including appropriate information and
recommendations to companies and departments on how to improve their algorithms. These
reports would also recommend legal action by proper authorities if necessary.
If the public and policymakers know what is happening, they can better debate what
action should be taken. Predictive policing, properly used, has the potential to make law
enforcement more effective and efficient. However, this should not be achieved without
understanding what it does and whether it is discriminatory. Legislatures can solve this problem
by requiring regular audits of the algorithms that police departments use. These audits can be a
powerful tool to enhance transparency and accountability for predictive policing.

